How a rating is made
Standard 0.2 beta · published for review · every rating here is experimental
A GAMMA-Ray rating is a public reading of public evidence, in the tradition of the public ratings of websites' encryption and of companies' security posture: every input is linked, the rules are published, and anyone can check the arithmetic or correct a fact.
The label
This is what a rating looks like when it is shown somewhere else. One for each of the 5 scans so far:
- The large number is the level the agent is held at: the freedom its evidenced governance supports. For a product it is the range of freedom across its configurations, because a product is not held at anything until it is deployed.
- The lines beside it are never left off: what it reaches, its governance, its grant, and what is on its work order.
- Beta rating stays on the label until the standard leaves beta.
The steps, on one example
The example is RiskMandate Publisher, one of our own agents, because its grant and its mandate are both published.
1. Say what is being rated. One agent in one deployment. For a product, which configuration.
2. Answer the questions. 21 questions, 72 indicators. Each answer is a yes with a source, the date read, and how it is known. No evidence means "not evidenced", never "no".
3. Decide which answers count. A fact is one of two kinds:
- a statement fact: publishing it is the evidence. A purpose written down, an owner named, a policy published.
- an operation fact: it has to be true while the agent runs. These count only when they are observed or measured. If they are only stated, they are shown as claimed and do not raise a level.
There are 11 operation facts:
I23What it can reach is enumerated: scopes, permissions, tools. Read from a grant profile only: a description of permissions in prose does not count.I28Its tokens are bound to the service they were issued for and are not passed on.I41Its actions are logged. The log must cover what the agent does (its tool calls, commands or commits), not only what is released.I42The log is tamper-evident and kept for a stated time.I43It is monitored in operation. Somebody or something must be shown to look at the record while the agent runs: a dated report, an alert, a review.I44Anomalies are detected in real time and raise alerts.I45A limit on it is enforced by something outside its own reach. Read from a measured grant only. It holds when every capability in the grant whose effect cannot be undone sits behind a boundary.I48Policy is enforced as machine-readable rules.I51It is tested for safety and security, including by attack. The agent itself must be tested, including by attack. Scanning the code or content it produces is a different fact.I62Third-party components are monitored and have risk controls.I64Compliance evidence is produced continuously, ready for a regulator.
Some other facts have a scope note, so that a near miss is not credited:
I12Several agents coordinate inside the organisation. Agents that each have their own context and authority and pass work between them. One agent delegating a side task inside its own session does not count.I34A governance policy for agents is published. A policy that is in force for this agent. A product feature that lets an operator deploy rules is a mechanism, not a policy.I49The difference between what it can reach and what it is for is stated. Needs both a mandate and a grant. Without a written mandate there is no delta to state.S1It is in production: a public source names a customer or gives usage figures for what it does on its own. A public source has to name a customer, or give usage figures, for the capability that acts. A demonstration or a roadmap does not count.S2Others build on it: third parties publish integrations, skills or agents for it. Third parties, not the vendor, publish the integrations, skills or agents.S3It is machine-readable for agents: it publishes an llms.txt, an AGENTS.md, an API description or an agent card. Checked by fetching the file: an llms.txt, an AGENTS.md, an OpenAPI description or an agent card that resolves.
4. Compute freedom. From the first five questions: what it is built on, whether it acts, how far it reaches, whether it works with other agents, and the person's role. The Publisher reaches level 5.
5. Measure the grant. What its permissions actually let it do, capability by capability, with the barrier in front of each. This is RiskMandate's measurement.
6. Compute governance. Each level is a pattern over the indicators. Two of them are read from the measured grant and never from words: that the grant is enumerated, and that every capability whose effect cannot be undone is behind a boundary.
| Level | Name | What is evidenced | Reached when | Clears freedom up to |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 0 | Unstated | Nothing about how it is governed is evidenced | default | 1 |
| 1 | Stated | What it is for and the rules for it are written down | I20 and one of I34 I47 | 2 |
| 2 | Owned | Somebody answers for it, a person can step in, and what it does is logged | level 1 and one of I30 I32, one of I38 I39, and I41 observed or measured | 3 |
| 3 | Bounded | Its grant is measured, every capability that cannot be undone is behind a boundary, and it is watched | level 2 and, from a measured grant, I23 and I45; and I43 observed or measured | 4 |
| 4 | Proven | Results are shown and somebody independent has checked | level 3 and I50, and one of I52 I63 I64 | 5 |
7. Hold the level. The agent is held at the lower of the freedom it reaches and the freedom its governance clears.
The filled dot is what the evidence supports. The hollow dot is where the agent's own statements would put it.
8. Write the work order. Most consequential first: capabilities the mandate refuses that are in the grant anyway; capabilities that cannot be undone and are not bounded; then the evidence the next level is missing.
9. Issue the label, and put everything in a vault. The rating, its evidence list and its grant go into a public vault whose read key is on the rating's page.
The deployment matters: the matrix
The same product is a different agent depending on how it is set up. So a product is rated per configuration, and it gets no governance level: that belongs to whoever deploys it.
| Product | Freedom as shipped | Across its configurations | Controls as shipped | Grant | Deployment governance |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Claude Code on the web | 4 Acts widely | 4, 4, 5 | 12 | 15 of 23, 3 bounded | not assessed |
| Claude Code, on your own machine | 2 Suggests | 2, 2, 4, 2, 5 | 12 | 16 of 23, 0 bounded | not assessed |
| GitHub Copilot cloud agent | 4 Acts widely | 4, 4 | 10 | not measured | not assessed |
Claude Code on the web
| Configuration | What changes | Freedom | Controls it brings | Turned on by the operator |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| As shipped | The Default environment with Trusted network access. | 4 Acts widely | 12 | nothing |
| A configured environment | Network access, variables and a setup script set by the operator. | 4 Acts widely | 13 | its autonomy limits and the tools it may use are defined |
| With agent teams | Experimental; off by default. | 5 Coordinates | 12 | several agents coordinate inside the organisation |
Claude Code, on your own machine
| Configuration | What changes | Freedom | Controls it brings | Turned on by the operator |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| As shipped | Manual mode: shell commands and edits ask first. | 2 Suggests | 12 | nothing |
| Sandbox on | Shell commands confined by the operating system. | 2 Suggests | 13 | a limit on it is enforced by something outside its own reach |
| Auto mode | A classifier reviews actions instead of the person. | 4 Acts widely | 12 | the agent works independently; the person approves critical decisions only |
| Managed by an organisation | Managed settings, permission rules and telemetry. | 2 Suggests | 16 | its autonomy limits and the tools it may use are defined; its actions are logged; it is monitored in operation; policy is enforced as machine-readable rules |
| Auto mode, tools and agent teams | Everything that widens what it does. | 5 Coordinates | 12 | it connects to external tools or services across a trust boundary; the agent works independently; the person approves critical decisions only; several agents coordinate inside the organisation |
GitHub Copilot cloud agent
| Configuration | What changes | Freedom | Controls it brings | Turned on by the operator |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| As shipped | The firewall and its recommended allowlist are on. | 4 Acts widely | 10 | nothing |
| With external tools connected | Model Context Protocol servers and other applications. | 4 Acts widely | 10 | it connects to external tools or services across a trust boundary |
The deployments rated so far:
| Deployment | Reaches | Governance | Held at | By its own statements | Grant | Work order |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| RiskMandate Publisher | 5 Coordinates | 1 Stated | 2 | held at 3 | 17 of 23, 3 bounded | 4 items |
| The PrompTugal.news agent team | 5 Coordinates | 2 Owned | 3 | the same | not measured | 2 items |
What changed from the last version, and what moved
The rules changed after an outside review of site v0.0.2. Three changes:
- Evidence has to be eligible. Operation facts count only when observed or measured.
- A boundary has a scope. One bounded capability no longer satisfies "bounded". Every capability that cannot be undone has to be behind a boundary, read from a measured grant.
- A product has no governance level. It has configurations.
Four answers in the product examples were wrong and were removed or corrected. All 5 scans were then replayed:
| Scan | Before (site v0.0.2) | Now | Why |
|---|---|---|---|
| RiskMandate Publisher | freedom 5, governance 2, held at 3 | freedom 5, governance 1, held at 2 | Its logging evidence is a release record, self-reported, and does not cover what the agent does; an operation fact now has to be observed or measured. Governance 2 became a claim. |
| The PrompTugal.news agent team | freedom 5, governance 2, held at 3 | freedom 5, governance 2, held at 3 | Unchanged. Its logging and monitoring are now cited to run reports and hourly reviews committed in the public repository, which are observed. One answer was removed: a list of what its hooks cannot see is not a delta. |
| Claude Code on the web | freedom 4, governance 0, held at 1; with options: freedom 5, held at 1 | freedom 4, 4, 5 by configuration; governance not assessed | A product is no longer given a governance level or a level held. The delta was removed (no mandate), and coordination now means agent teams, which are off by default. |
| Claude Code, on your own machine | freedom 2, governance 0, held at 1; with options: freedom 5, held at 2 | freedom 2, 2, 4, 2, 5 by configuration; governance not assessed | As above. Managed settings are recorded as an enforcement mechanism, not as a policy in force. |
| GitHub Copilot cloud agent | freedom 4, governance 0, held at 1 | freedom 4, 4 by configuration; governance not assessed | As above. Scanning of generated code is no longer counted as testing of the agent. |
What a rating is not
- Not a certification, an audit or a security review.
- Not a judgement of a vendor. A product example says what the product does and controls as documented.
- Not final. This is a beta. The mapping behind the questions has had one reader, the level rules are a draft, and a rating will move when they do.
To correct a fact in a rating, the page of each rating names its sources; the repository is public.